of direct donation, i.e. C E (Direct) = C N (Direct) and
then L is less likely to choose direct donation over no donation after the introduction of exchange.
Proof. This result holds because patient k's outcome does not improve with exchange introduction under direct donation, while k's expected outcome does improve when k's prospective donor, L, does not donate. L will donate directly when
If U L (N one) increases more than U L (Direct) when exchange is introduced, then the probability that U L (Direct) ≥ U L (N one) will decrease.
Given that exchange introduction has no effect on the cost of donating directly, nor the benefit that L derives from donating to patient k, the effect of exchange introduction on the utility derived from each choice is given by the following:
and ∆U L (N one) = ∆B k (Q(N one)).
If patient k's expected outcome improves with the introduction of exchange when L does not donate, such that
then L is less likely to donate directly, relative to not donating at all, after the introduction of exchange.
A.2 Proof for Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Suppose again that the introduction of exchange does not affect the costs nor the benefits to L of direct donation, i.e. C E (Direct) = C N (Direct) and B k (Q E (Direct)) = B k (Q N (Direct)). Then a representative prospective donor L is more likely to become a living kidney donor if the introduction of exchange increases the net utility of donating via exchange, relative to not donating, by a larger magnitude than it increases L's reservation utility, i.e.
[U
Proof. L is more likely to become a living kidney donor -that is, the increased likelihood of donating via exchange outweighs the decreased likelihood of donating directly -if
This becomes:
Recall the following relationship from equation (2):
This implies that equation (6) reduces to:
The last step is a simple rearrangement of terms for interpretation purposes:
Alternatively, for interpretation purposes, we can substitute in the terms for each utility and rearrange. We then obtain:
M B (M S) represents marginal benefit (marginal surplus) of donating via exchange over not donating at all, ∆C(Exch) represents the change in cost of donating via exchange before and after introduction, and ∆B k (Q(N one)) is the change in benefit L derives from k's well-being following exchange introduction.
A.3 Proof for Proposition 3
Proposition 3. If the cost of donating anonymously is unaffected by the introduction of exchange, i.e. C E (Anon) = C A (Anon), then individuals without a loved one in need of a kidney will be more likely to donate anonymously to start a (sufficiently long) donor chain and less likely to donate anonymously to a single patient following the introduction of exchange.
Proof. Potential donor A will donate anonymously when
If U A (Anon) increases when exchange is introduced, then Prob[U L (Anon) ≥ 0] will increase.
The effect of exchange introduction on the utility derived from donating anonymously is given by the following:
If the cost of donating anonymously is the same whether or not exchange has been introduced (i.e. ∆C(Anon) = 0), then ∆C(Anon) drops out implying that A will be at least as likely to donate anonymously following the introduction of exchange if
This condition says that A will be more likely to donate anonymously if the introduction of exchange increases the total surplus that A's donation generates for patients in need of transplants. Now, since the introduction of exchange improves patients' outside options, it is likely that ∆S i (Q(Anon)) < 0. If, after the introduction of exchange, anonymous donations are not shifted toward the use of starting exchanges via donor chains, then we would expect a reduction in anonymous donations. However, if A's donation facilitates at least one transplant beyond i's (the direct recipient), then the additional surplus is very likely to outweigh the small negative effect of exchange on the surplus generated by A's donation to i. This table presents the results from estimating the effect of exchange activity on the probability that a patient receives a transplant within 2 and 4 years, dies within 2 and 4 years, or still needs a kidney (conditional on being alive) after 2 and 4 years (which includes those who had one or more transplants that failed within 2 and 4 years, respectively) of initially registering on a deceased donor waiting list. Using initial registration is the most consistent/reliable way to measure start of transplant candidacy, though it does omit living donor transplant recipients who never register. In Panel A, Activity is defined as the number of exchange transplants performed within 50 miles of the patient's zip code of residence in the month of registration, while it is defined as the total number of exchange transplants within 50 miles in the first year following registration in Panel B. All of the outcome variables are binary. Interpretation of Wald IV estimates: a one percentage point increase in probability of ever receiving an exchange increases outcome of interest by β percentage points. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (at zip code level). Significance indicated by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix C Robustness
In this appendix, I discuss several tests to address the primary concerns raised in Section IV.A about the validity of Activity. I also show that, while the estimates vary within reasonable ranges, the preferred specifications yield results that are robust to using activity within 30 and 75 miles rather than 50, using a lagged measure of local exchange activity, using a linear probability model to estimate substitution patterns, dropping zip codes with no exchange activity across the sample period, and excluding the location-by-time controls.
First, I test whether current outcome measures appear to affect future levels of local exchange activity, conditional on controls for patient characteristics, zip code fixed effects, month-year fixed effects, location-specific linear time trends, and state-year fixed effects. Tables C1 and C2, suggests that positive shocks to waiting list deaths are correlated with future increases in local exchange activity. However, this result is primarily driven by a positive coefficient on the 3-and 4-month lead, while the 5-and 6-month lead has a statistically significant negative coefficient. While the joint F-test does provide some support for the concern that centers adopt and promote kidney exchanges in response to worsening outcomes, this finding is not corroborated by similar pre-trends in any of the other outcomes of interest.
Next, I test whether patients endogenously move or change zip code of residence in order to pursue exchange transplants. I observe patients' zip codes of residence at the time of registration on the deceased donor waiting list and again when they receive a transplant.
However, I cannot perfectly observe whether patients engage in such behavior because (1) not all patients receiving living donor transplants register on the deceased donor waiting list and (2) I do not observe an updated zip code for patients who died while waiting. With these limitations in mind, I analyze whether exchange activity near patients' current zip code at time of transplant predicts a change in zip code, whether exchange activity near patients' original (listing) zip code at the time of transplant predicts a change in zip code, and whether, conditional on observing a change in zip code, the Activity differential between patients' current and original zip code is correlated with the type of transplant received. I find that patients receiving a direct living donor transplant are the least likely to change zip codes (9.1 percent), while patients receiving a deceased donor transplant are the most likely to change zip codes (16.3 percent). Exchange and anonymous donor recipients are in the middle at 11.8 percent and 14.3 percent, respectively. Despite these differences, however, there appears to be no relationship between exchange activity and moving behavior. Column 1 of Table C3 suggests that patients living in more exchange-active zip codes at the time of transplant are no more likely to have changed zip codes than patients living in less exchangeactive zip codes. Similarly, column 2 suggests that the level of exchange activity at time of transplant in a patient's original (listing) zip code is not correlated with whether that patient changed zip codes. Finally, columns 3 through 6 suggest that, among patients who changed zip codes, the differential in exchange activity between their current and original zip codes is not correlated with the type of transplant received. In an additional set of analyses, I show that the main results are robust to the possibility of endogenous moving. To do this, I estimate the substitution and quality effects using restricted estimation samples that exclude patients whose associated deceased donor waiting list registration is in a different donor service area (DSA) than the one in which they live. The results, presented in Table   C4 , are virtually identical to the central results presented in Tables 3 and 4 of the main text.
I turn now to the question of whether the estimates identified using Activity are sensitive to the use of different mileage radii in determining the level of local exchange activity. Panel A of Table C5 presents To address this concern, I re-estimate the main specifications using a one month lagged measure of Activity. Anonymous donations and exchange transplants can only facilitate current or future transplants via exchange, hence the use of a lag to avoid the possible reverse causality issue. However, lags also reduce the precision of the estimates of interest as the lag is likely to be worse at capturing network externalities generated by the nearby occurrence of exchange transplants. Panel C of I also test the robustness of the preferred results by estimating the substitution patterns using a linear probability model analogous to the approach used for the quality analyses.
Panel D of Table C5 Due to the inclusion of many zip codes that never experience an exchange transplant or nearby exchange activity in the estimation sample, one may wonder if the results are robust to dropping such areas. Addressing this concern, Panel E in Table C6 and Panel C
in Table C7 present the estimation results. The substitution patterns do not differ much from the full sample: 38 percent of exchange recipients substitute away from direct living, while 0.06 additional anonymous donations occur for each additional exchange transplant.
This implies 68 percent of exchanges represent new living donor transplants. The quality estimates follow a similar pattern as the full sample, though they are attenuated. A one percentage point increase in the probability of receiving an exchange increases one-year survival by 0.15 percentage points, while the estimate on two-year survival is positive but insignificant. The effect of Activity on HLA mismatches is indistinguishable from zero, and the effect on registration duration is negative and statistically insignificant (p=0.14).
Tables C6 and C7 present estimates from alternate specifications that exclude state-year fixed effects, location-specific time trends, or both. In Panel H of Table C6 and Panel F of Table C7 , we see that excluding state-year fixed effects has no substantive impact on the substitution and quality results. However, excluding/including zip code-specific linear time trends does affect the substitution estimates (Panels F and G in Table C6 ). The first-stage estimates are essentially unchanged, but we see larger Wald IV estimates of substitution away from direct living transplants (roughly 80 percent of exchange transplants) and increase in anonymous donations (14 percent). We also see estimated substitution away from deceased donor transplants go to zero when excluding zip code-specific linear time trends. This finding appears to highlight the importance of including location-specific time trends. That said, the exclusion of county-specific linear time trends has less of an impact on the quality results (see Panels D and E of Table C7 ). Here, the graft survival estimates are slightly attenuated, though still statistically significant, and the estimated reduction in registration duration is magnified by 70 to 90 percent and becomes statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (at zip code level). Regressions include month-year fixed effects, zip code fixed effects, county-specific linear time trends, and state-year fixed effects. They also include controls for age at listing, previous transplant status, PRA score, blood type, gender, ethnicity, education. The non-death-censored graft survival variables assume transplant survival for those whose last known status is alive with a functioning kidney transplant. Excludes patients who experienced a non-transplant outcome. One-year graft survival excludes 2013-14 data, two years excludes 2012-14. Waiting list registration duration is set to 0 for the living donor transplant recipients who do not register on the deceased donor waiting list. Leads and lags are two-month totals. Significance indicated by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Excludes patients whose associated deceased donor waiting list registration is in a different DSA than the one in which they live, those whose zip code is not observed at the time of registration, and those who did not register before receiving a transplant. Otherwise, the notes for Panel A are the same as in Table 3 and the notes for Panel B are the same as in Table 4 . 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (at zip code level). Regressions include monthyear fixed effects, zip code fixed effects, county-specific linear time trends (unless stated otherwise), and state-year fixed effects (unless stated otherwise). They also include controls for age at listing, previous transplant status, PRA score, blood type, gender, ethnicity, education. The non-death-censored graft survival variables assume transplant survival for those whose last known status is alive with a functioning kidney transplant. Excludes patients who experienced a non-transplant outcome. One-year graft survival excludes 2013-14 data, two years excludes 2012-14. Waiting list registration duration is set to 0 for the living donor transplant recipients who do not register on the deceased donor waiting list. Significance indicated by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Registration Duration
Estimates from Table C2 . Joint F-test on Leads: 0.32 (1-year Survival), 0.47 (2-year Survival), 0.96 (HLA Mismatches), 1.12 (Registration Duration)
